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Comments and Casenotes
THE PLEA OF NOLO CONTENDERE
By THOMAS C. HAYDEN, JR.
The twentieth century has seen the revival of the use of the plea
of nolo contendere in criminal proceedings' after the plea had fallen into
disuse and was apparently headed for oblivion. Generally speaking,
the plea of nolo contendere is an implied confession which admits the
facts charged in the indictment and thus is similar to a guilty plea.
However, the nolo plea admits the facts for the sole purpose of the
criminal prosecution. Therefore, unlike a guilty plea, it cannot be used
as an admission in a subsequent civil suit.
The plea had it origin in the English common law, and the classic
statement indicating its characteristics is found in Hawkins:
"An implied confession is when a defendant, in a case not
capital, doth not directly own himself guilty, but in a manner admits
it by yielding to the King's mercy, and desiring to submit to a small
fine: in which case, if the court think fit to accept of such sub-
mission, and make an entry that defendant prosuit se in gratiam
regis, without putting him to a direct confession, or plea (which
in such cases seems to be left to discretion), the defendant shall
not be estopped to plead not guilty to an action for the same fact,
as he shall if the entry is quod cognovit indictamentum."'
Thus, it seems that in England the plea was originally in the nature of
a petition for mercy, and the courts still have a tendency to reduce
punishment when a nolo plea is entered.'
There is no reported use of the plea in England since 1702,' and
the plea has apparently been discarded there. However, the nolo
plea has found refuge in America. The use of the plea in this
country has not brought about any radical departure from the Hawkins
definition, although some problems have arisen concerning the use
and effect of the plea. The renaissance of the plea is particularly
1. For a general discussion of the plea, see Annot., 89 A.L.R.2d 540 (1963),
supplementing 152 A.L.R. 253 (1944); 14 Am. Jur. Criminal Law § 275 (1938)
and 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 425 (1961).
2. HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 466 (8th ed. 1824)
cited in Hudson v. United States, 272 U.S. 451 (1926).
3. See, e.g., Hudson v. United States, 272 U.S. 451 (1926), where the Court
states at p. 457: "Undoubtedly a court may, in its discretion, mitigate the punishment
on a plea of nolo contendere and feel constrained to do so whenever the plea is accepted
with the understanding that only a fine is to be imposed. But such a restriction made
mandatory upon the court by positive rule of law would only hamper its discretion
and curtail the utility of the plea."
4. Regina v. Templeman, 1 Salk 55 (Q.B. 1702), appears to be the last reported
use of the plea.
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evident in criminal anti-trust prosecutions where a growing number
of defendants have used the plea in recent years.'
By making a plea of nolo contendere the defendant has an oppor-
tunity to mitigate his punishment and avoid the stigma of a guilty
plea. Additionally, he avoids the time and expense involved in de-
fending a criminal prosecution. Equally important to the defendant
is the knowledge that the plea does not estop him to deny the facts
in a subsequent civil suit arising out of the same facts.
I. APPLICABILITY
The plea of nolo contendere is recognized in the federal courts
and in the majority of the states.7 However, it has been held in some
states that if the plea is not provided by statute, it is not available to
a defendant.8
Although courts have accepted a nolo plea in cases involving
abortion,9 arson,x° assault," espionage, 12 larceny, 3 and rape,' 4 the de-
termination of the applicability of the nolo plea to a particular
crime is a difficult problem. It can be stated generally that the plea
is more likely to be accepted to a misdemeanor charge than to a
charge of a felony." Also, both federal and state courts are in clear
agreement that the plea cannot be made to an indictment for a
capital offense unless specifically allowed by statute.'" This limitation
5. See Lenvin and Meyers, Nolo Contendere: Its Nature and Implications, 51
YALe L.J. 1255 (1941-42).
6. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure states: "A defendant
may plead not guilty, guilty, or, with the consent of the court, nolo contendere."
7. Young v. People, 53 Colo. 251, 125 P. 117 (1912) ; Krowka v. Colt Patent Fire
Arm Mfg. Co., 125 Conn. 705, 8 A.2d 5 (1939); State v. Febre, 156 Fla. 149, 23
So. 2d 270 (1945) ; Nelson v. State, 87 Ga. App. 39, 75 S.E.2d 39 (1953) ; Louisiana
State Bar Assoc. v. Connolly, 206 La. 883, 20 So. 2d 168 (1944); Cohen v. State,235 Md. 62, 200 A.2d 368 (1964) ; State v. Perkins, 129 Me. 477, 149 At. 148 (1930) ;
Chester v. State, 107 Miss. 459, 65 So. 510 (1914) ; Nebraska State Bar Assoc. v.Stanosheck, 167 Nebr. 192, 92 N.W.2d 194 (1958) ; In re Berardi, 23 N.J. 485, 129
A.2d 705 (1957); State v. Barley, 240 N.C. 253, 81 S.E.2d 772 (1954); Common-
wealth v. Shrope, 264 Pa. 246, 107 At. 729 (1919) ; State v. McElroy, 71 R.I. 379,
46 A.2d 397 (1946); Roach v. Commonwealth, 157 Va. 954, 162 S.E. 50 (1932);
State v. Page, 112 Vt. 326, 24 A.2d 346 (1942) ; State ex rel. Clark v. Adams, 144
W.Va. 771, 111 S.E.2d 336 (1959); Brozosky v. State, 197 Wis. 446, 222 N.W. 311(1928) ; McNab v. State, 42 Wyo. 396, 295 P. 278 (1931).
8. May v. Lingo, ... Ala ... , 167 So. 2d 267 (1964) ; In re Eaton, 14 Ill. 2d338, 152 N.E.2d 850 (1958) ; Mahoney v. State, 196 Ind. 335, 149 N.E. 444 (1925) ;Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Cloonan, 165 Kan. 68, 193 P.2d 656 (1948) ; State v.
Kiewel, 166 Minn. 302, 207 N.W. 646 (1926) ; People v. Daiboch, 265 N.Y. 125, 191
N.E. 859 (1934) ; and Laughlin v. Lamar, 205 Okla. 372, 237 P.2d 1015 (1951).
9. State ex rel. Gehrmann v. Osborne, 79 N.J. Eq. 430, 82 Atd. 424 (1912).
10. Teslovich v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., 110 Pa. Super. 245, 168 Atl.
354 (1933).
11. Orabona v. Linscott, 49 R.I. 443, 144 Atl. 52 (1928).
12. Farnsworth v. Sanford, 33 F. Supp. 400 (D. Ga., 1940).
13. Collins v. Benson, 81 N.H. 10, 120 Atl. 724 (1923).
14. Johnson v. Johnson, 78 N.J. Eq. 507, 80 Atl. 119 (1911).
15. 14 Am. Jur. Criminal Law § 276 (1938).
16. Hudson v. United States, 272 U.S. 451 (1926); Commonwealth v. Shrope,
264 Pa. 246, 107 Atl. 729 (1919) ; and Roach v. Commonwealth, 157 Va. 954, 162 S.E.50 (1932). But see State v. Martin, 92 N.J.L. 436, 106 Atl. 385 (1919). Section 2A:
113-3 of N.J. STAT. ANN. provides that "Nothing herein contained shall prevent the
accused from pleading non vult or nolo contendere to the indictment [for murder];
the sentence to be imposed, if such plea be accepted, shall be either imprisonment forlife or the same as that imposed upon a conviction of murder in the second degree."
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seems to follow as a matter of course from Hawkins' definition of the
plea's applicability to "cases not capital". The theory of the limitation
is that capital cases are so serious that an implied confession should
not be allowed to "rise to the degree of certainty which would make
it the equivalent of an express confession. "17
It is now settled that the nolo plea can be accepted by the federal
courts in felony indictments. This question was presented for the first
time in Tucker v. United States," which held, "[T]he rule affords
no grounds for entertaining the plea, either in cases of felony, requiring
infamous punishment to be imposed on conviction, or in cases of mis-
demeanor for which the punishment must be imprisonment for any
term, with or without fine."' 9  This position was changed by the
Supreme Court in Hudson v. United Sates,2" where the defendants were
allowed to plead nolo contendere to a charge of using the mails to
defraud, a felony punishable by fine or imprisonment, or both, and
were sentenced to imprisonment for a year and a day. The Supreme
Court held that the statement in Hawkins' definition - "desiring to
submit to a small fine" - was illustrative only and not a condition
binding on the court.
The state courts are in disagreement as to whether the plea can
be accepted on felony indictments. Of those states which recognize
the plea, it is settled in four that the plea can be made on a felony
indictment.2' Two other states22 have limited the applicability of the
plea to misdemeanors. The limitation of the plea to cases of misde-
meanors appears more in keeping with Hawkins' definition, which
states that the defendant is willing "to submit to a small fine". The
commentators seem to agree with this position.2
II. ACCEPTABILITY
In jurisdictions where the plea is recognized, courts are in agree-
ment that the plea cannot be entered by the defendant as a matter
of right, and that acceptance of the plea is discretionary with the
court,24 as is the withdrawal of a nolo plea and substitution of another
plea.25
17. Commonwealth v. Shrope, 264 Pa. 246, 250, 107 Atl. 729, 730 (1919).
18. 196 F. 260 (7th Cir. 1912).
19. Id. at 267.
20. 272 U.S. 451 (1926).
21. Commonwealth v. Ingersoll, 145 Mass. 381, 14 N.E. 449 (1888); State v.
Martin, 92 N.J.L. 436, 106 Atl. 385 (1919) ; Commonwealth v. Shrope, 264 Pa. 246,
107 At. 729 (1919) ; and In re Lanni, 47 R.I. 158, 131 Atl. 52 (1925).
22. Williams v. State, 130 Miss. 827, 94 So. 882 (1922) ; and Roach v. Common-
wealth, 157 Va. 954, 162 S.E. 50 (1932). In the latter case, the court stated, "[U]nder
the prevailing law in this state a plea of nolo contendere cannot be accepted in a
felony case." 162 S.E. at 52.
23. See, e.g., ANDERSON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 1903
(1903) ; and BISHOP, NEW CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 802.2 (4th ed., 1895).
24. Hudson v. United States, 272 U.S. 451 (1926) ; Mason v. United States, 250
F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1957) ; United States v. Lair, 195 F. 47 (8th Cir. 1912) ; Twin
Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 26 F. Supp. 366 (D. Minn. 1939); Cohen v. State,
235 Md. 62, 200 A.2d 368 (1964) ; Commonwealth v. Horton, 26 Mass. 206 (1829)
and Williams v. State, 130 Miss. 827, 94 So. 882 (1922).
25. Withdrawal of the plea has been allowed in Lott v. United States, 367 U.S.
421 (1961) and Sullivan v. United States, 348 U.S. 170 (1954). Contra, United
1965]
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Since the acceptance of the plea is discretionary with the court,
there is only a small number of cases in which the acceptability of the
plea has been litigated. In United States v. Jones,2" defendants wanted
to plead nolo contendere to avoid providing evidence which could be
used against them in potential civil litigation. The court adopted a
liberal approach in accepting the plea, stating, ". . . in the absence of
some reason why a defendant should not have the benefit of the plea,
the Court will ordinarily allow it to be entered.""1
Later cases have not adhered to the liberal approach of Jones.
The case of United States v. Bagliore2 s stated that, "although the general
policy of this Court is hostile to the acceptance of such a plea (nolo
contendere), circumstances surrounding the event and the condition of
the defendant frequently make a strong appeal to the exercise of the
Court's discretion."2 9 The Bagliore court accepted the plea, saying that,
"in the trial of a criminal action, mental disorder and abnormality
existing at the time of the act charged appears to be a just and
equitable reason for accepting a plea of nolo contendere."'3
In United States v. Chin Doong Art,3 the defendant and others
were charged with conspiracy to violate the criminal laws of the
United States with respect to entry, residence, and citizenship. A first
trial ended in a deadlocked jury, and the defendant applied for per-
mission to enter a nolo plea. In support of his application the defendant
argued that a second trial would involve many additional witnesses,
that he would be spared harsh and unnecessary results by a plea of
nolo, and that he had been a prominent citizen.
In denying the nolo plea, the court concluded that "the primary
purpose of accepting a plea of nolo is to promote the administration of
justice. This means justice not only for the defendant but also for the
public. The Court cannot permit its action with respect to a plea
of this type breed contempt for law enforcement. '3 2  The court in-
dicated that it would not accept a nolo plea "unless the situation is
an extraordinary one, ' 3  and that the presence of moral turpitude in a
case is a factor in determining the acceptability of the plea.3 4 Since
the government had to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, the
court concluded that although the case would be difficult and pro-
tracted, this factor alone did not per se present an exceptional circum-
States v. Central Supply Ass'n, 74 F. Supp. 388 (N.D. Ohio 1947). Rule 32(d) of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that motions to withdraw a plea
of nolo contendere may be made before sentence is imposed.
26. 119 F. Supp. 288 (S.D. Cal. 1954).
27. Id. at 290.
28. 182 F. Supp. 714 (E.D.N.Y. 1960).
29. Id. at 716.
30. Ibid. The court also pointed out that "A plea of nolo contendere has advan-
tages to a criminal defendant and, like a plea of guilty, it is also beneficial to the
Government in dispensing with the necessity of a trial."
31. 193 F. Supp. 820 (E.D.N.Y. 1961).
32. Id. at 823.
33. Id. at 822.
34. Ibid.
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stance.3 5  The court conceded that the defendant's good record and
prominence as a citizen should be considered in his favor.
3 6
Other considerations are present in the determination of the ac-
ceptability of a nolo plea in anti-trust litigation. In Section 5 of the
Clayton Act, Congress has given private persons injured by violations
of the anti-trust laws the benefit of proceedings instituted by the
government. In a suit for treble damages under the Clayton Act,38
the injured party may use a final judgment or decree in the govern-
ment's case as prima facie evidence against the same defendants.
3 9
However, it has been held4" that a nolo plea is a consent decree entered
before any evidence is taken and thus comes within the proviso to
Section 5 which states, "that this section shall not apply to consent
judgments or decrees entered before any testimony has been taken.
"141
In United States v. Standard Ultramarine & Color Co.,42 a criminal
prosecution under the Sherman Act,43 the court refused to accept a
nolo plea. The court placed emphasis on the fact that Congress by
the Clayton Act sought to encourage individuals to aid in the enforce-
ment of the anti-trust laws.44 In setting up guidelines for acceptance
of the plea, the court remarked:
"In deciding whether the public interest will be better served
by acceptance or rejection of the plea each case must be governed
by its own facts. Some, but by no means all, the factors to be
considered, or at least those which this Court deems relevant, are:
the nature of the claimed violations; how long persisted in; the
size and power of the defendants in the particular industry; the
impact of the condemned conduct upon the economy; whether a
greater deterrent effect will result from conviction rather than
from acceptance of the plea - obviously these will vary from case
to case."
45
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1963).
38. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1963).
39. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1963), provides:
"A final judgment or decree heretofore or hereafter rendered in any civil or criminal
proceeding brought by or on behalf of the United States under the anti-trust laws to
the effect that a defendant has violated said laws shall be prima facie evidence against
such defendant in any action or proceeding brought by any other party against such
defendant under said laws or by the United States under section 15(a) of this title,
as to all matters respecting which said judgment or decree would be an estoppel as
between the parties thereto: Provided, That this section shall not apply to consent
judgments or decrees entered before any testimony has been taken or to judgments or
decrees entered in actions under section 15(a) of this title." For application of the
statute, see Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558 (1951).
40. Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 26 F. Supp. 366 (D. Minn. 1939).
41. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1963), note 39 supra.
42. 137 F. Supp. 167 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
43. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1-7 (1963).
44. 137 F. Supp. 167, 172. The court stated: "It [section 5 of the Clayton Act]
was fashioned as a powerful weapon to aid private litigants in their suits against anti-
trust violators by reducing the almost prohibitive costs and staggering burdens of
such litigation in making available to him the results of the Government's successful
action, whether an equity suit or a criminal prosecution."
45. Ibid.
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The court concluded, "If violators may expiate their wrongdoing by
payments of token fines - by accepting the proverbial 'slap on the
wrist' - and to boot, avoid the impact of section 5 [of the Clayton
Act], then a powerful deterrent to law violation has been removed."4 6
The Standard Ultramarine court had no difficulty in distinguish-
ing United States v. Cigarette Merchandisers Ass'n., Inc.4 7 In Cigarette
Merchandisers a nolo plea was accepted to the criminal indictment.
However, in that instance the government had filed a civil suit for an
injunction in addition to the criminal indictment. The Standard Ultra-
marine court pointed out that, ". . . in the event the Government is
successful [in the civil suit] the decree will be available to private
parties. In the instant case, no such civil suit was instituted.
' 48
Thus, it seems that the acceptability of the plea is not susceptible to
reliable prediction. Since discretionary areas of the law such as this
are seldom thoroughly reviewed at the appellate level, it seems un-
likely that the problem will be clarified. The only concrete statement
that can be offered is that if acceptance of the plea would be of benefit
to the defendant as well as to the public, there is a greater possibility
that the plea will be accepted.
There are two reasons suggested for the hesitancy of courts to
accept a nolo plea. First, it is suggested that the plea is frequently the
result of a compromise between the prosecutor and the defendant, and
the court would rather not be party to such compromise.49 This argu-
ment is not too convincing, however, since the court may give maximum
punishment even under a nolo plea." Second, there is an argument that
the accused is either guilty or not guilty.5 This reasoning can be
rebutted successfully since the reported decisions hold that the fact
of conviction is the same after a nolo plea as after a guilty plea.52
It should be pointed out, however, that the cases are not in agreement
as to whether a nolo conviction is sufficient to disqualify an applicant
under a statutory license scheme, which excludes applicants who have
been convicted of a crime. 3
III. EFFECTS IN THE CASE
It is generally agreed that the acceptance of a plea of nolo con-
tendere has the same effect as a plea of guilty.54 Imposition of sentence
46. Ibid.
47. 136 F. Supp. 214 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
48. 137 F. Supp. 167, at 174. See also United States v. Safeway Stores, 20 F.R.D.
451 (N.D. Tex. 1957).
49. See Lenvin and Meyers, supra note 5, at 1268.
50. See quote from Hudson v. United States, 272 U.S. 471 (1926), supra note 3.
51. See Lenvin and Meyers, supra note 5, at 1268.
52. In United States v. Reisfeld, 188 F. Supp. 631 (D. Md. 1960), the court stated,
"It is generally held that a plea of nolo contendere followed by judgment amounts to a
conviction." 188 F. Supp. at 632.
53. See notes 66-70 infra and accompanying text.
54. Lott v. United States, 367 U.S. 421 (1961) ; United States v. Lair, 195 F. 47
(8th Cir. 1912); United States v. Reisfeld, 188 F. Supp. 631 (D. Md. 1960);
Connelly v. Balkcom, 213 Ga. 497, 99 S.E.2d 817 (1957) ; Neibling v. Terry, 352 Mo.
396, 177 S.W.2d 502 (1944) ; State v. D'Amico, 167 A.2d 542 (R.I. 1961) ; and Ells-
worth v. State, 258 Wisc. 636, 46 N.W.2d 746 (1951).
232 [VOL. XXV
PLEA OF NoLo CONTENDERE
is all that remains to be done following acceptance of the plea,55 since,
".. . in the face of the plea no issue of fact exists, and none can be made
while the plea remains of record." 56 It has been held that only testi-
mony bearing on the issue of punishment can be offered after the plea
has been accepted."
The plea admits, for the purposes of the case, all the facts well
pleaded5" and waives all defects in the proceedings of which the de-
fendant could have availed himself by a plea in abatement, a demurrer,
or a motion to quash.59 However, "ordinarily a plea of nolo contendere
leaves open for review . . . the sufficiency of the indictment." 6 Thus,
entry of the plea does not preclude the defendant from moving in arrest
of judgment on the theory that there are defects in the indictment or
that the indictment does not charge him with a punishable offense.
IV. CONSEQUENCES OUTSIDE THE CASE
The most important ramifications of the plea of nolo contendere
are found outside the case in which the plea is entered. Although the
plea acts as an admission of guilt for the purpose of the case, it is
uniformly recognized that the plea does not estop the defendant to
deny the facts upon which the prosecution was based in a subsequent
civil suit.6 ' Disregarding the practical considerations such as mitigation
of punishment and saving of time, here lies the only real distinction
between the nolo plea and the plea of guilty.
In State ex rel. Woods v. Thrower,6 2 the defendant was convicted
on a nolo plea of a felony (tax evasion) while holding office as Com-
missioner of the City of Dothan. Subsequently, a proceeding in the
nature of quo warranto was brought against Thrower on the theory
that under certain statutes he was disqualified from holding office
because of the prior conviction. The Alabama court held that since
Thrower's conviction was based on a nolo plea it had no effect outside
the criminal case.
A most interesting and paradoxical result has been reached by the
Pennsylvania court in applying this principle. Teslovich v. Fireman's
Fund Insurance Company63 was a suit on an insurance policy to re-
55. United States v. Denniston, 89 F.2d 696 (1937).
56. United States v. Norris, 281 U.S. 619 (1930).
57. State v. Barbour, 243 N.C. 265, 90 S.E.2d 388 (1955).
58. Lott v. United States, 367 U.S. 421 (1961).
59. In Cohen v. State, 235 Md. 62, 200 A.2d 368 (1964), at 68, the court said, "Bypleading nolo contendere, he [appellant] waived his right to object to the alleged pro-
cedural defects and his right to have them considered on appeal." The federal courts
have accepted this view also, see, e.g., Dillon v. United States, 113 F.2d 334 (8th
Cir. 1940), at 339, where the court stated, "The appellants have no standing, in view
of their pleas of nolo contendere, to argue that they did not have a fair trial. By
entering their pleas they precluded a trial." But see State v. Barbour, note 57 supra.
60. Brotherhood of Carpenters v. U.S., 330 U.S. 395, 412 (1947).
61. United States v. Norris, 281 U.S. 619 (1930) ; United States v. Reisfeld, 188
F. Supp. 631 (D. Md. 1960); Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 26 F. Supp. 366(D. Minn. 1939); State ex rel. Woods v. Thrower, 272 Ala. 344, 131 So. 2d 420(1961); and Teslovich v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., 110 Pa. Super. 245, 168
Atl. 354 (1933).
62. 272 Ala. 344, 131 So. 2d 420 (1961).
63. 110 Pa. Super. 245, 168 Atl. 354 (1933).
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cover damages to property which the defendant had insured. The
plaintiff had been convicted of arson on a nolo plea, and the insurance
company offered to prove the entry of the plea to establish that the
plaintiff had caused the fire to defraud the company. The court
concluded that the conviction under the plea of nolo contendere could
not be used against the plaintiff as an admission in any civil suit con-
cerning the same act.
There is, however, a growing minority of courts which have
allowed a judgment of conviction after a trial to be admitted in a later
civil case involving the same issues, as evidence of the facts on
which the judgment was based.64 It is conceivable that states following
this minority view may permit a previous nolo conviction, in addition
to previous convictions after trial, to be admitted in a subsequent civil
suit.
Outside the realm of the immunity discussed above, the conse-
quences of the plea vary little from the consequences of a plea of
guilty. It has been held that a conviction under a nolo plea is regarded
as the same as a conviction under a guilty plea for purposes of multiple
offender statutes0 5
However, the effect of a conviction under a nolo plea on the qualifi-
cations of an individual for a license issued by the state is unsettled.
Under a North Carolina statute calling for revocation of a driver's
license upon conviction of driving while under the influence of in-
toxicating liquor, it has been held that:
it... in every case of a conviction - and a plea of noto
contendere is equivalent to a conviction by a jury for the purposes
of that case - of driving a motor vehicle while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor the driver shall be punished, and
shall be prevented from operating motor vehicles upon the high-
ways . ',66
In a similar situation the Georgia court has reached an opposite con-
clusion. 7 In New Jersey it has been held that a judgment and com-
mitment following a nolo plea did not amount to conviction within
contemplation of a statute authorizing the State Board of Medical
Examiners to suspend or revoke licenses upon conviction, 68 but a
later case indicates a possible change in the state's position. In In re
64. See MCCORMICK, EvIDPNCE § 295 (1954), citing Fidelity Phoenix Fire Ins.
Co. v. Murphy, 226 Ala. 226, 146 So. 387 (1933) ; North River Ins. Co. v. Militello,
100 Colo. 343, 67 P.2d 625 (1937); and Eagle, Star and British Dominions Ins. Co.
v. Heller, 149 Va. 82, 140 S.E. 314 (1927). 5 WirMORE, EVIDENCg § 1671(a) (1940),
states the general rule that a judgment in another case, finding a fact in issue in a
subsequent suit, is ordinarily not receivable in a subsequent suit. However, Wigmore
suggests that it is unreasonable and impractical to ignore the evidential use of a
judgment in another proceeding involving the same fact as in the subsequent suit
and lists the insurance policy-arson situation as an example where the prior judgment
should not be ignored.
65. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Bruno v. Reimer, 98 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1938).
66. Fox v. Scheidt, 241 N.C. 31, 84 S.E.2d 259, 263 (1954).
67. Nelson v. State, 87 Ga. App. 39, 75 S.E.2d 39 (1953).
68. Schireson v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 130 N.J.L. 570, 33 A.2d
911 (1943).
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Berardi,69 a conviction of a misdemeanor for tax evasion was held to
be sufficient grounds for revocation of a detective license, the court
stating:
"While it is true that the plea of nolo contendere is not binding
in a collateral civil proceeding for the same wrong and the de-
fendant is not estopped in the same proceeding to deny his guilt,
. . . nevertheless proof of such plea is receivable in evidence in a
proceeding under a statute enacted under the police power where
the test or standard is the good character, competency, or the
integrity of the applicant or licensee." '7°
The reported decisions seem to indicate a trend that a nolo plea is a
conviction in the licensing area, and thus a distinction between the
nolo plea and a plea of guilty appears here to be fading away.
A similar problem has arisen concerning the admissibility of a
nolo conviction to attack the credibility of a witness in a subsequent
suit. In State v. Herlihy,7 the defendant was indicted for keeping in-
toxicating liquors. Defendant took the stand in his own defense, and
evidence of a former conviction under a nolo plea was introduced for
the purpose of impeaching the credibility of the defendant. It was argued
that evidence of his former conviction was not admissible, since under
the nolo plea there had not been an adjudication of the defendant's guilt.
However, the court rejected this contention and allowed the nolo con-
viction to be used for impeachment purposes. An opposite result was
reached in Wright v. State,72 where it was held that evidence of the
conviction of a witness in a federal court based on a plea of nato
contendere was not admissible in a criminal case in an Alabama court
for the purpose of discrediting the witness. Since it is generally held
that the acceptance of a nolo plea is a conviction, it would seem that
the conviction should be available for impeachment purposes.7 3
V. THE PLEA IN MARYLAND
The Maryland Rules of Procedure recognize the availability of
the plea of nolo contendere in Rule 720. This rule gives the accused
the right to plead, "with the consent of the court, nolo contendere."
Thus, Maryland is in agreement with the theory that entry of the
plea is discretionary with the court. Rule 723 sets up the procedure
to be followed in making application to enter the plea and also points
out the effect of the plea. According to Rule 723, a nolo plea "has
the effect of submitting the defendant to punishment by the court."
Although the rule does not specifically state whether the entry of a
69. 23 N.J. 485, 129 A.2d 705 (1957).
70. Id. at 710.
71. 102 Me. 310, 66 Atl. 643 (1906).
72. 38 Ala. App. 64, 79 So. 2d. 66 (1954).
73. See Annot., 146 A.L.R. 867 (1943), for a general discussion of use of the
nolo conviction for impeachment purposes. It has been held that a conviction of
perjury on a nolo plea does not render the defendant incompetent to testify, Fidelity-
Phoenix Fire Ins. Co. of New York v. Murphy, 231 Ala. 680, 166 So. 604 (1936).
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nolo plea is a conviction, it appears that since the plea is an implied
confession of guilt, subjects the defendant to punishment, and other-
wise has the same effects as a conviction under a guilty plea or a con-
viction after a trial, Maryland would consider the entry of a plea a
conviction.
Like the statutes of many other states, the Maryland Rules do not
give any indication of the kinds of cases in which the plea is available.
The three cases involving nolo pleas decided by the Court of Appeals
shed little light on this matter. In Fellner v. Bar Association,74 a nolo
plea was allowed to a charge of inserting slugs in city parking meters.
In Cohen v. State' and Lifshutz v. State,6 the plea was accepted to
an indictment for conspiracy to obtain money by false pretenses.
Thus, it appears arguable that the plea should be available in Mary-
land, subject to the discretion of the court, to indictments for non-
capital felonies and misdemeanors. However, one author has indicated
that the plea is available only in misdemeanors.7 7
There are no readily available statistics to determine the frequency
with which the plea is used in Maryland. Judging from the fact that
only three cases have reached the Court of Appeals on this point, it seems
probable that its use is rare. The apparent frequent use of the plea
may be explained by a statutory provision78 which could be used as a
substitute for the nolo plea. This provision allows the trial judge to
place the accused on probation without finding a verdict.79
CONCLUSION
The usefulness of the plea of nolo contendere cannot be evalu-
ated in abstract terms. Whether the plea is of any value in the
administration of justice depends upon the circumstances of each
individual case. For this reason it seems wise to leave the determi-
nation of the acceptability of the plea to the discretion of the trial
judge.
It seems that when there are important public policy considera-
tions involved the plea can be used to advantage. One commen-
tary has stated:
74. 213 Md. 243, 131 A.2d 729 (1957).
75. 235 Md. 62, 200 A.2d 368 (1964).
76. 236 Md. 428, 204 A.2d 541 (1964).
77. GINSBERG & GINSBERG, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE IN MARYLAND 372
(1940). The authors do not cite any authority for their statement.
78. MD. CODE ANN. Art. 27, § 641 (1957).
79. The 1963 Annual Report of State's Attorney's Office of Baltimore City indi-
cates that of 4,926 criminal indictments brought to trial, 278 were disposed of by
probation before verdict. The 1962 Report indicates that 269 of 4,450 total indict-
ments were disposed of by probation before verdict. See Mutter, "Probation In The
Criminal Court of Baltimore City", 17 MD. L. Rev. 309 (1957). At p. 314, the author
states: "Probation before conviction (similar to probation without verdict) is a rela-
tively recent innovation intended to bring legal and social philosophy closer together
in the area of rehabilitation of criminal offenders. The practice has been to provide
the aforementioned type of probation to individuals whom the Court feels are deserving
of some protection from the stigma of a criminal record. However, in receiving this
probation, the individual 'consents' to abide by such conditions as those imposed in
probation in the ordinary course. It is important to note that probation before convic-
tion is not intended to be a compromise verdict."
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"There are many situations, of which anti-trust prosecution
is one, where the crime is considered malum prohibitum rather
than malum in se, and in such situations the prosecutor is often
inclined to agree to the interposition of the nolo plea. This realistic
policy dispenses with lengthy and expensive trials. A law enforce-
ment agency having concurrent equitable and criminal power, like
the Federal Anti-trust Division, frequently follows an indictment
with a civil complaint, thereby seeking appropriate injunctive
relief against the continuance of the offense charged in the indict-
ment. Thus, the closing out of criminal cases by a nolo plea is
simply preliminary to getting down to the job of eradicating the
improper practices. At the same time, the pleader has paid his
debt to society for past offenses and it can hardly be said that
in making a nolo plea the accused leaves the question of his guilt
undetermined."8 0
The fact that the plea is to some extent in the nature of a plea
for mercy should not adversely affect the plea's usefulness. Since ac-
ceptance of the plea does not preclude the court from imposing the
maximum sentence allowed by statute, it would seem that the nature
of the plea is necessarily a reason for denying it.
The reasoning of the cases seems to suggest, however, that unless
there are some public policy considerations favoring the plea, it should
be refused. It would appear, however, that the acceptance of the plea
could be allowed almost as a matter of course in minor violations,
such as traffic offenses, without adversely affecting the administration
of justice.
It is apparent that the statutes and rules of court regulating the
use of the plea are in need of revision, which will provide more definite
standards for determining its availability and total effect. This would
eliminate much speculation and guess-work in regard to the plea.
80. Lenvin and Meyers, supra note 5, at 1268. (Italics added.)
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